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 On August 29, 2005, “Katrina” was still only the name of an unusually large 
cyclonic storm (a “category-4 hurricane”). A few days later, it had become shorthand for 
a complex economic, political, and social disaster. A long stretch of the Gulf coast had 
become more or less uninhabitable. The convenient measure of time necessary to undo 
the damage would, it seemed, be years rather than weeks or months. New Orleans, one of 
the oldest cities in North America, a major port, had all but ceased to exist, many of its 
million residents seeking refuge far from home. State governors and federal 
administrators were blaming each other both for the slow response to the disaster—and 
for the severity of the disaster itself. The head of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency was soon to resign in disgrace. 
There is no doubt that Americans in general, and our students in particular, did 
find—and continue to find—Katrina “interesting”, even “relevant”. And, unlike much 
that they find interesting or relevant, Katrina clearly has connections with engineering. 
As one professor of engineering said: 
 
"Nothing this big has ever happened before in civil engineering." 2  
 
At perhaps $300 billion in destruction, Katrina is certainly the biggest engineering 
disaster in the history of the United States. 
Yet, I doubt that Katrina is a good case for teaching engineering ethics—for now 
at least. There are at least three distinct reasons for doubt. First, there is the question of 
what happened. For a number of crucial decisions, we still do not know what their 
consequences were or what was thought to justify them. Second, there is the question of 
what part engineers had in what happened, which decisions were theirs and which 
belonged to elected or appointed officials who were not engineers. Third, there is the 
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question of what part engineering ethics had, or should have had, in the decisions 
engineers did make (whatever those were). So far we lack any dramatic moment such as 
the Challenger disaster provided, a moment when ethics mattered in a way both precise 
and interesting. 
Though I have mentioned three reasons for my doubt’s about Katrina’s use in the 
classroom, this talk will focus almost entirely on the first—or, rather, on an important 
part of the first, our uncertainty about what caused the flood-control system of New 
Orleans to fail so disastrously. 
 
Background 
Even on an ordinary day New Orleans is a city that must work to prevent 
flooding. One of the world’s largest rivers, the Mississippi, flows through it. From 
Jackson Park, the heart of the French Quarter, one of the highest points in the city, one 
can see the muddy river rushing by six feet or so above the street. The Mississippi would 
flood the city were it not for the levees that hold it back. Nor is the Mississippi the only 
watery threat. Though older parts of the city are as much as thirty feet above sea level, 
much of the city is below sea level, and the sea, the Gulf of Mexico, reaches New Orleans 
at its back, through Lake Pontchartrain.  Mostly developed since 1900, the newer parts of 
the city are, like much of the Netherlands, dry only because water is constantly pumped 
out of them. But for the huge screw pumps designed a century ago by a local engineer, 
Albert Baldwin Wood, New Orleans would be exactly what it was when Europeans first 
settled there in 1718, a small crescent-shaped island in a huge swamp. 
While engineers did not found New Orleans, it has long survived only because of 
engineering—and it suffered disaster in part because the engineering was not better. 
While the levees along the Mississippi held, other parts of the flood-control system 
failed. The most important failures seem to have occurred along the 17th Street, London 
Avenue, and Industrial canals. (One breach in the 17th Street floodwall alone was 465 ft. 
long.) These canals are basically channels made by floodwalls, the floodwalls being a 
pair of “I” or inverse “T”-shaped slabs of poured concrete set on sheet pilings. The canals 
carry water pumped from low areas of the city to Lake Pontchartrain. Even on a dry day, 
the surface of the water in these canals may be ten or more feet above the neighboring 
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street (and even higher relative to the lowest parts of the city). It is no surprise, then, that 
not long after parts of the floodwalls gave way, three fourths of the city was under water; 
some parts under as much as twenty feet of water.3 Indeed, such an event had long been 
predicted.4 That much is undisputed. 
 
Cause: “take 1” 
For almost a month after Katrina smashed through New Orleans, the predominant 
view seems to have been that the cause of the disaster was water flowing over the 
floodwalls; the walls had failed because the cascading water had undermined them from 
the street side. There was good reason for this view. At many places, especially along 
Lake Pontchartrain, observers had actually seen water coming over the levees; and there 
was, in any case, plenty of evidence of just the sort of erosion “overtopping” would 
produce. 
On this view, Katrina had only the simplest of lessons to teach. The flood-control 
system had been built to withstand a category-3 storm; a category-4 storm had 
overwhelmed it.5 Engineering is about trade-offs. Had those responsible for the 
floodwalls, the Army Corps of Engineers or the New Orleans Levee Board, spent more, 
New Orleans could have had floodwalls and levees high enough to hold back a category-
4 storm. New Orleans would then have survived Katrina more or less as it had many 
category-3 storms. Some government agency had made a bet and lost. Whether the 
agency was right to bet that way is a political question, not a question of engineering. The 
engineers had informed both the decision-makers and the public. The only interesting 
question for engineering ethics is whether engineers should have done more to inform 
decision-makers or the public, how much would have been “enough”, and how they were 
to tell when they had done it. 
  
Cause: “take 2” 
Not long after the flood waters began to recede, two dozen or so engineers from 
the American Society of Civil Engineers, UC-Berkeley, and Louisiana State University 
began cooperating on a study of the disaster. They entered the city as soon as they could, 
hoping to complete the onsite part of their work before repair destroyed much of the 
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evidence. On November 2, they issued a preliminary report, 129 pages long, full of useful 
detail and revealing photographs.6 A fine piece of forensic engineering, it doubtless 
conceals many ethical issues resolved during drafting. I wish someone would tell us 
about the drafting process. But I digress. 
Among the report’s findings are several that do raise quite interesting questions of 
engineering ethics. There was, it turned out, no evidence that water in the three canals 
ever reached the fourteen-foot level necessary for water to cascade over the floodwalls. 
Both onsite evidence and computer modeling seemed to show that the water in the canals 
never rose above twelve feet. In some places where a floodwall had failed, big chunks 
had simply moved back as much as thirty-five feet, an effect inconsistent with 
overtopping being the cause of failure. The best explanation of such catastrophic failure 
seemed to be that the subsoil had become too wet to hold the pilings in place. The piles 
gave way, freeing the floodwalls to slide back under the pressure of the rising water. This 
explanation suggests either a design flaw (a failure of engineers) or a contractor who did 
not build to specifications (and engineers who did not check work carefully enough).7 
There was, in fact, evidence of both. 
The evidence for the design failure was a set of calculations showing that even if 
the pilings had been as designed, they would have failed when the water in the canal 
reached eleven or twelve feet. The Army Corps of Engineers had, it seemed, used the 
wrong rule to design the pilings. According to Billy Prochaska, a consulting engineer 
who participated in the preliminary report, the rule the Corps used applies “if you have 
uniform soils, and we certainly don’t have that in the New Orleans area.”8 The Corps 
should have adjusted its standard design for the special conditions of New Orleans. 
Everyone knows its soil is both unusually porous and unusually variable. The pilings 
should have gone much deeper. What was the Corps thinking? 
 The evidence that the floodwalls did not meet even the inadequate standard the 
Corps had set consisted of “sophisticated ground sonar that showed that sheet pilings that 
should have been sunk seventeen feet only went down ten”.9 These soundings had been 
taken along parts of the floodwall that were intact but close to breaches. The Times-
Picayune, New Orleans’ daily newspaper, even obtained the “final review set of design 
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drawings for the project”. These showed “the pilings on the New Orleans side of the 
canal were to be driven 10 feet”.10 
That seemed to be the last word. Even on December 22, 2005, the date I stopped 
my research, the entry for Katrina in Wikipedia (the online encyclopedia) still asserted: 
“The flood was caused by several levee breaches due to misdesign by the United States 
Army Corps of Engineers, improper construction, and lack of supervision by the Orleans 
Levee Board.”11 
 
Cause: “take 3” 
 As of that date (December 22), the Corps of Engineers still seemed to accept the 
finding that the design was, if not a mistake, at least a decision that experience had shown 
should not be repeated. The Corps was proposing to replace the 17 foot pilings with 
pilings that would go down 51 feet (three times as deep).12 But the Corps continued to 
insist that the present pilings were 17 feet, not 10. And, by December 13, 2005, it had 
good reason so to insist. The Corps had hired a contractor to use sonar to identify eight 
“10-foot pilings”. The contractor then pulled the pilings and measured them. All turned 
out to be 17 feet pilings, not 10. Whatever the merits of its design, Corps supervision of 
construction seems to have been adequate. Or, rather it would so seem did not some of 
the engineers who issued the preliminary report (“Team Louisiana”) dispute the 
reliability of the sonar the Corps contractor used to pick pilings (while not disputing the 
length of the pilings actually measured or claiming to have pulled and measured any 10-
foot pilings). When, and how, this dispute will end is anyone’s guess.13 The December 22 
Wikipedia entry on Katrina may yet turn out to be right. 
 
Conclusion 
 One of the advantages that “hypothetical cases” often have over “current events” 
is that they do not change while one is discussing it (or, at least, does not change in ways 
the instructor cannot control) while current events can (and often do) change quite a bit. 
Another advantage is that an instructor is much less likely to get bogged down over 
disputed details (such as the cause of the disaster). 
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Of course, I agree that, all else equal, the richer the case the better (though I must 
add that, if time is short, a thin case may be better than a rich one). I also agree that a case 
is rich (in part at least) if it is “multidimensional”, that is, a coming together of technical 
design, management, and ethical issues. While I think that a hypothetical can, in 
principle, be as rich as a real case, I admit that reality tends to have a complexity that is 
hard to invent. And I would add that cases known to be real tend register in the “moral 
imagination” of students in a way similar but invented cases do not. Fact can teach 
lessons the merely hypothetical cannot. I even agree that the facts surrounding Katrina 
may some day have all those virtues. What I deny is that they have them now. What I 
have tried to show here is that we do not yet know enough about what actually happened 
to know who made the decisions, why, or when. We do not know what issues of 
engineering collided with what management issues. We do know what the ethical issues 
were—and when, if ever, engineers had a part in resolving them. We do not know what 
information decision-makers had at the time they decided what they did. What we have 
now is not a multidimensional case but a confused one; the difficulties we face in 
understanding the past are not the difficulties the decision-makers faced. All anyone 
teaching engineering ethics can do with Katrina now is resolve confusions such as I have 
described here by stipulating (more or less plausible) possibilities. What we get that way 
may (or may not) be a rich, multidimensional case. What it will not be a real case; it will 
be an ordinary hypothetical, as cut and dried as we choose to make. It will be no more 
likely to seize the imagination of our students than any other hypothetical case—unless 
we present it as what it is not, what actually happened, a way of teaching engineering 
ethics that strikes me as, well, unethical. So, for now at least, I recommend putting off the 
use of Katrina in class. 
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